US Treasury Targets Iran’s Global Clandestine Currency Networks

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has sanctioned a network of exchange houses, companies and facilitators accused of helping Iran’s shadow banking system move hundreds of millions of dollars across multiple jurisdictions.
Announced on August 7, 2026, the action focuses on financial networks connected to Iran’s Shahr Bank and its so-called rahbar companies—front companies used to retrieve, transfer and repatriate overseas revenue. Treasury said the networks supported Iranian petroleum exporters and helped the regime retain access to foreign currency despite international sanctions.
Exchange Houses and Shell Companies
According to Treasury, Shahr Bank relied on two Dubai-based exchange-house fronts: Titan Exchange and Alps International. Titan Exchange had facilitated transactions requested by Shahr Bank and its previously sanctioned affiliate Farab Soroush Afagh Qeshm, known as FSAQ. By early 2026, Titan Exchange allegedly held tens of millions of dollars on behalf of Shahr Bank.
FSAQ also worked with Alps International to arrange payments through China- and UAE-based shell companies. Treasury described an operational team that prepared transaction documents, selected shell companies to receive funds and generated supporting invoices before coordinating transfers through intermediary bank accounts. In 2026, Alps International allegedly enabled hundreds of millions of dollars in transactions across multiple currencies.
OFAC designated Titan Exchange for materially assisting Shahr Bank and designated Alps International for operating in Iran’s financial sector. The action also covered additional companies and facilitators connected to the payment network.
Broader Pressure on Iran’s Shadow Banking System
Treasury said this was OFAC’s eighth action in 2026 targeting Iran’s shadow banking apparatus. Previous measures had focused on Iranian banks, exchange houses, front companies, financiers, and importers and exporters that rely on these structures to move or repatriate revenue.
OFAC also designated Basheer Abdulkadhim Alwan al-Shabbani for allegedly supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force by facilitating the movement of fighters, weapons and money from Iran to aligned groups in neighboring countries.
Sanctions Implications
Property and interests in property of designated persons that are in the United States or controlled by U.S. persons must be blocked and reported to OFAC. Entities owned 50 percent or more by blocked persons are also blocked. Treasury warned that foreign financial institutions facilitating significant transactions for designated persons may also face secondary sanctions, including restrictions on access to U.S. correspondent banking.
The action illustrates how sanctions evasion can combine exchange houses, trading companies, fabricated invoices and intermediary accounts into a coordinated cross-border payment network. Screening individual names alone may therefore be insufficient without examining ownership, payment purpose and links among banks, exchange houses and shell companies.



