UK Issues First Nationwide A7 Sanctions-Evasion Alert and Plans to Double OFSI Penalty Cap

The UK government and National Crime Agency issued the country’s first nationwide industry alert focused on the Kremlin-backed A7 network on 31 August 2026, warning financial institutions and other private-sector firms about methods used to circumvent international financial and trade sanctions.
The alert is intended to help the private sector identify and disrupt financial structures used by A7 to regain access to the international financial system. HM Treasury said the network relies on third-country financial institutions and cross-border payment structures to move funds around sanctions restrictions. The government also said A7 has links to Iranian state-associated actors.
A7 says it processed more than $86 billion in its first year
According to the UK government, A7 itself claims to have settled more than $86 billion in transactions during its first year of operation. The government described the network as operating through a complex web of financial structures across multiple jurisdictions, with third-country institutions playing an important role in completing cross-border transactions.
The new alert follows earlier UK action against A7 and related infrastructure. On 26 May 2026, the government targeted banks, entities and individuals linked to the network, including third-country enablers in Central Asia and West Africa. Previous UK measures also targeted crypto infrastructure associated with sanctions circumvention, including the Grinex and Garantex exchanges.
The National Economic Crime Centre said the alert is designed to give industry greater visibility into mechanisms used to evade sanctions. The NCA linked the initiative to its wider work against professional money-laundering and sanctions-evasion networks, including Operation Destabilise.
OFSI maximum penalty increase announced
Alongside the A7 alert, the Chancellor announced that the government intends to double the maximum monetary penalty available to the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation from 50% to 100% of the value of a sanctions breach.
The increase should not yet be treated as an already effective statutory maximum. OFSI said earlier in 2026 that changing the statutory maximum requires legislative change. Its current published general guidance still states that the maximum monetary penalty may be the greater of £1 million or 50% of the value of the breach, depending on the applicable legal framework.
The announced change would therefore materially increase potential exposure for firms once the necessary legislation takes effect. It also builds on OFSI’s wider 2026 enforcement reforms, which introduced a clearer case-assessment framework, settlement arrangements and incentives for voluntary disclosure and early cooperation.
For compliance teams, the immediate operational development is the A7 industry alert: firms exposed to cross-border payments, correspondent banking, trade finance or crypto-related flows should ensure that sanctions monitoring can identify third-country intermediaries and structures used to obscure the ultimate economic purpose of transactions.
Update: leaked files describe a $6.9 billion bank-payment network
Last updated: 23 September 2026. A Financial Times investigation published on 21 September, based on leaked internal A7 files, reported that more than $6.9 billion in A7-linked payments moved through the international banking system using front companies and falsified trade documentation. The report describes a network spanning jurisdictions including the UAE, Hong Kong and Kyrgyzstan, with invoices, customs descriptions and other records allegedly altered to conceal Russian involvement and the underlying purpose of payments.
The findings add operational detail to the sanctions-evasion risk already identified by UK and U.S. authorities. The UK government has described A7 as a Kremlin-backed network designed to bypass Western sanctions and process cross-border payments, while the U.S. Treasury designated A7 in August 2025 in connection with Garantex and sanctions-evasion infrastructure. The new reporting should be treated as investigative reporting rather than a regulatory finding: the specific $6.9 billion figure and transaction-level mechanics come from leaked files reviewed by the Financial Times, not from a final enforcement decision.
The reported payment pattern is relevant to correspondent banking and trade-finance controls because it combines sanctioned-network exposure with ordinary bank transfers, third-country companies and apparently legitimate commercial documents. It illustrates why sanctions screening limited to named counterparties can miss risk where front companies and falsified invoices are used to separate a payment from its ultimate origin or purpose.



