Nigeria FIU Report Shows 42,082 STRs and 28.1 Million PEP Transaction Reports in 2025
Nigeria’s Financial Intelligence Unit (NFIU) received 42,082 Suspicious Transaction Reports (STRs), 10,513 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) and 41,716,214 Currency Transaction Reports (CTRs) during 2025, according to figures in the agency’s 2025 Annual Report. The NFIU’s official website now lists the 2025 report alongside its earlier annual reports.
Deposit Money Banks accounted for 38,715 STRs, or about 92% of the total. Other Financial Institutions submitted 2,185, Designated Non-Financial Businesses and Professions filed 1,029, capital-market and insurance entities submitted 104, and Virtual Asset Service Providers filed 49 STRs.
The annual data also show a significant change in reporting volumes. STR filings fell from more than 82,000 in 2024, while CTRs increased to 41.7 million. SARs also declined compared with the previous year. The figures do not by themselves indicate that financial crime fell; they describe the volume and mix of regulatory reports received by the FIU.
PEP monitoring generated more than 28 million reports
The NFIU recorded 28,133,909 reports involving transactions by Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) during 2025. Deposit Money Banks submitted the overwhelming majority, with quarterly volumes of 7,263,557 in Q1, 5,658,079 in Q2, 6,235,585 in Q3 and 8,225,572 in Q4.
Other Financial Institutions reported 12 PEP transactions in the first quarter, rising to 692 in Q2, 104,565 in Q3 and 617,286 in Q4. Capital Market Intermediaries reported 3,986 in Q1, 17,016 in Q2, 3,345 in Q3 and 4,214 in Q4. The report recorded no PEP transaction reports from VASPs during the year.
NFIU guidance distinguishes these regulatory PEP reports from STRs: PEP status alone does not require an STR. Reporting entities are expected to apply enhanced due diligence and close monitoring to PEP relationships, while filing an STR when suspicious activity is identified.
Terrorist-financing typologies highlight proxy identities and crowdfunding
The annual report also identifies emerging terrorist-financing methods involving crowdfunding, proxy bank accounts, mobile-banking channels and third-party identity information. Nigerian media reporting on the NFIU findings describes foreign-based facilitators soliciting relatively small donations under humanitarian, educational or medical pretexts before consolidating and transferring funds to Nigeria.
Other reported techniques include accounts opened in women’s names but controlled by other individuals, phone numbers linked to third parties or deceased persons, and the use of remittance and fintech channels to fragment transfers and make the financial trail harder to follow.
For AML teams, the report is a reminder that reporting volume is only one measure of effectiveness. The more operationally important question is whether institutions can connect identity, PEP, transaction and network-level signals quickly enough to identify suspicious activity that may be distributed across multiple accounts and payment channels.
